In Eger, in the middle of the city about two hours North-East from Budapest, someone plastered “Allahu Akbar” on the billboards of the opposition party. In Budapest, “Orban vagy Turbán” (Orban or Turbans) scrawled on the bridge over the Danube. In every town and village on the Hungarian plain, you will find propaganda posters from the ruling and opposition parties are scattered along the main roads. Some even made it across the Northern border, in the villages, a list of Hungarian names in Slovak on road signs, where they still call city hall “város Haza”, is the Slovak equivalent.
Some foreign observers—and, frankly, quite a lot of Hungarians to worry about that Viktor Orban, Hungary’s populist-conservative Prime Minister, is on the verge of installing a one-party state. More excitable critics insist that Orban already the autocrat in all but name, and that the last election was complicated sham. Steve Bannon, whose name inspires a certain existential horror of American liberals, was named Prime Minister of Hungary hero. The Parallels between the old boss’bannon and Orban almost too obvious: the party “fides” billboards face the Prime Minister next to the words “Nekünk profile magyarország AZ első”—“with us, Hungary in the first place”.
On Sunday, this message was enough to return Orban as Prime Minister of Hungary, along with a healthy Fidesz majority in Parliament. But Hungary is a sham democracy, as critics of Orban to fight, or just a country, whose electoral results to offend the feelings of American liberals and technocrats of the EU? The answer, like most questions in Eastern Europe, it is difficult. Orbán is not Putin, and regardless of the election results, Hungary is not a one party state. Much of the criticism directed at Orban in the Western press is, no doubt fueled by contempt for his outspoken opposition to the EU, in particular its position on immigration (it should be noted that it is Orban who is in sync with the Hungarian public opinion—not much enthusiasm for open borders in Eastern Europe). But there are worrying signs on the horizon, and in less than a generation after the fall of communism, it would be wrong to take the health of liberal democracy in Eastern Europe for granted.
First, the good news. Despite the launch of sustainable success in the elections, the ruling party Fidesz continues to face challenges of the political spectrum. Social media is replete with criticism of Orban and his associates, while the independent media openly and stridently criticize the government and its policies. Two trivial factors explain the recent victory of “fides” is: a relatively strong Economy and the fragmentation of the opposition. The current parties generally benefit from sustained economic growth, and there are reasonable objections that the policy of the Orban helped Hungary to survive the financial crisis and its aftershocks.
Fault lines within the opposition is aggravated by the curious case of Jobbik, a Neo-fascist party, who clumsily tries to rebrand itself as a respectable alternative to the center-right Fidesz. Given the complex history of the party, so no wonder leftists want to coordinate with candidates Jobbik or to vote tactically to deny Fidesz a majority. Meanwhile, many of the original supporters of Jobbik was excited about his turn in the center. Across several billboards of the party in Eger-one word: “áruló” (traitor).
The loss of “fides” in the elections of February to the mayor, which shall be in the ruling party is sufficient proof of the vitality of Hungarian democracy. Other signs are not so encouraging. The Internet remains free and vital forum for discussion, but the print media are increasingly dominated by big business friendly Orban and Fidesz. In the human rights organization “freedom house”, hardly a hotbed of leftist agitation, now the prices on the Hungarian media as only “partly free”. Political groups at the ideological struggle of the spectrum with indifference and indifference to corruption.
The legacy of Communist rule is obvious, like a massive apartment buildings that dominate the suburbs of Hungary. Public indifference is not so obvious how ugly architecture, but it really is nevertheless a constant reminder that half a century of communism did to the political culture of the country. Professor andrás Tarnóc, who teaches American studies and political Sciences, eszterházy károly University, in Eger, says that a particularly acute problem in Hungary because of the country’s unique postwar history. After the uprising of 1956, the Hungarian authorities allowed his subjects more personal freedom in exchange for the implicit understanding that the policy was closed. This situation gave the Hungarians an unprecedented degree of autonomy within the Eastern bloc, but it also engendered indifference to corruption and the feeling that politics is somebody else’s problem.
Surprisingly high turnout on Sunday suggests that the country starts to shake off that pre-1989 thinking. Still, when discussing political corruption in Hungary, the weary fatalism often creeps into the conversation. For drinks with a group of Hungarians on the eve of elections, a friend casually dismissed the idea that any party or politician will actually fight corruption. Almost everyone at the table nodded resignedly.
Lurking in the background is the specter of immigration, the problem is that Fidesz has relentlessly hammered the opposition largely avoided, preferring instead to focus on several high-profile cases of corruption and a General sense of fatigue with the ruling party. The least charitable interpretation of fides immigration campaign is that it is the latest sign of the country’s slow descent into fascism, a crude political ploy, which uses a modest EU refugee resettlement program to exploit xenophobia and chauvinism lurking just below the surface of Hungarian society.
A more charitable observer would raise two counterpoints. First, the Hungarians read the news. The permanent state of emergency that prevailed in France after the attack on the “Bataclan”, series-truck and van of terrorist attacks throughout Western Europe, a rash of sexual violence in Cologne, the unwillingness of integration in such places as Jean—these problems are real and not a figment of your social networks or rave right press. If the countries of Western Europe, with their large financial resources and a relatively long history of development of novices struggle with immigration, as Hungary rate? The recent sending of a guardian of Miskolc incredulously reports that Hungarians worry about immigration, despite the fact that I have never seen a migrant. But it’s really shocking that people in Miskolc, a city that has become a byword in Hungary after the industrial downturn can worry about adding another problem to the already long list?
The second point is the history of Eastern Europe. Hungary and her neighbours jealously guard their sovereignty because their history is largely the history of foreign domination. The idea of a national immigration policy dictated by the EU, an organization with a serious deficit of democracy and their own history of bureaucratic overreach, offends Patriotic feelings of many Hungarians. When Hungary joined the EU, it is hoped, according to Tarnóc, to join the “Europe of Nations, not a United States of Europe”. Accession will stimulate economic growth and to ratify Hungary as a member of the Western club. Yielding an essential part of national sovereignty to Brussels has never been part of the deal.
Patriotism can easily turn into something ugly, but it would be a mistake to ignore these sentiments only chauvinism. A country like Hungary, aware of its cultural inheritance and burdened by the history of foreign intervention, there will always be sensitive to concerns over sovereignty and national identity. Any account of the Hungarian politician who does not grapple with this fact is simply incomplete.
Will Collins is an English teacher who lives and works in Eger, Hungary.
Sourse: theamericanconservative.com
