Since President Donald Trump commenced his second term, his administration’s course of action regarding China has been debatably the most intricate facet of its foreign affairs to decipher. That stems, in part, from the fact that the key figures of Trump’s inner circle haven’t consistently appeared united amongst themselves or with the commander-in-chief regarding the degree of assertiveness to adopt against America’s most formidable superpower competitor.
Should there have been an apparent developing accord, it seemed Trump was inclined to challenge China on matters of trade and financial concerns — although, through its efficient leveraging of rare earth mineral resource chains, the nation proved more resistant to strain via commerce compared to the majority of other nations on the receiving end of Trump’s levies. Simultaneously, he displayed reduced eagerness in engaging militarily and geopolitically with China, a rivalry that has absorbed a significant portion of Washington — inclusive of his previous term’s administration — in recent times.
Leading up to Trump’s assembly on Thursday with Chinese Premier Xi Jinping in South Korea, Semafor’s Ben Smith envisioned the occasion would “terminate Washington’s decade of China hawks.” The apprehension among numerous individuals centered on Xi exploiting Trump’s yearning for a trade agreement in exchange for allowances on geopolitical matters where Trump demonstrates diminished concern. Of particular note, Xi is purportedly pursuing a statement from Trump that officially opposes Taiwan’s independence. (The present stance of the US is one of non-endorsement for a self-motivated stride toward Taiwan’s autonomy. While that may not register as a substantial difference, this remains a contention where nuances of this nature can wield considerable repercussions.) Prior to the meeting, a Trump staffer disclosed to NBC News that “everyone is holding their breath” anticipating what he would articulate concerning Taiwan.
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Eventually, according to Trump, the topic failed to surface throughout the gathering in Korea. Within the dialogues that Trump judged to be a “12 out of 10,” the two heads of state attained a cease-fire of sorts regarding trade complications: Trump conveyed his intention to decrease levies on China by 10 percentage points, while Xi consented to recommence procuring US soybeans, remove constraints on exports of rare earth materials, and pledged to clamp down on Chinese exports of chemicals employed in the manufacturing of fentanyl.
Thus, has the intensity waned? Indeed — concerning all subjects excluding the slight issue of atomic warfare.
Trump Unleashes a Nuclear “Bombshell”
Mere moments preceding the assembly with Xi, Trump disseminated a message on Truth Social declaring that he had sanctioned the re-establishment of nuclear testing:
Ascertaining a precise interpretation of this pronouncement proves challenging, given the prevalence of inaccuracies. Russia boasts a larger nuclear arsenal than the United States; the current US initiative to modernize nuclear capabilities remains several years from fruition. While China is augmenting its stockpile, it will not attain parity with the US within five years, even based on the most alarming projections from the Pentagon. The Department of Energy, as opposed to Defense, bears the responsibility for nuclear experimentation.
No nation, save for North Korea, has legitimately detonated a nuclear device since the 1990s. Trump may have been alluding to Russia’s recent assessment of a nuclear-proficient and nuclear-fueled torpedo.
Trump evaded a reporter’s inquiry concerning the proclamation in Korea, and the White House has yet to furnish a response to Vox’s petition for elaboration. Despite the US never having formally endorsed the international accord prohibiting nuclear trials, it hasn’t conducted one since 1992. Nevertheless, speculation of a shift has circulated. The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 proposed that the US should “demonstrate a readiness to undertake nuclear assessments in response to adversarial nuclear advancements, if required.” However, this declaration does not originate from technical exigency; the US, alongside other nuclear states, possesses numerous methods for verifying the trustworthiness of their arsenals without physically setting them off. Rather, it’s spurred by a determination to exhibit the believability of the US deterrent.
Should Trump genuinely intend a reversion to active nuclear trials — detonating warheads — that would constitute a noteworthy escalation, potentially provoking corresponding actions from Russia and China. Such a maneuver clashes with his recurrently expressed aspiration for “denuclearization” dialogues involving both Russia and China.
Regardless of his true intent, the timing directly before an assembly touted as a reduction in US-China friction appears far from accidental.
Does a Risk of Conflict Over Taiwan Persist?
Relief will be palpable within both Washington and Taipei that Trump refrained from “bartering” Taiwan’s independence for an accord on soybeans. That doesn’t negate the likelihood of the issue — the most probable point of ignition for a US-China military engagement — from fading away. While Trump may lack interest in a conflict with China, a conflict with China might still be interested in him.
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Trump has asserted his disbelief that Xi will assault Taiwan, regardless of the island being the “apple of his eye,” a sentiment that may prove valid given the overwhelming scale of a full-scale amphibious incursion, whether or not the US intervenes. Nevertheless, China’s endeavors to amplify duress on the nation — regarded by Beijing as a defiant province — appear more feasible. Such measures could span from intensified cyber intrusions to the seizure of one of Taiwan’s lesser outlying isles, or the imposition of a complete blockade. And these eventualities falling short of complete victory beg the question of how the US would act.
Under legislation enacted in 1979, the US bears the obligation to undertake actions to assist Taiwan in resisting any utilization of force aimed at altering its status, yet subsequent administrations have historically remained elusive regarding whether this would entail the actual deployment of military force to shield Taiwan from invasion — a policy termed “strategic ambiguity.” Joe Biden approached the closest of any prior president to relinquishing this policy, declaring on four distinct instances his conviction that the US was bound to defend Taiwan, albeit administration officials invariably retracted those assertions.
Trump has refrained from articulating anything akin to that, which Jason Hsu, a previous Taiwanese legislator and presently a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, communicated to me might ultimately prove beneficial. “Should he declare, ‘Indeed, America will defend Taiwan,’ that would induce complacency in Taiwan,” Hsu remarked. Within Taiwan’s locale, laxity can be hazardous. “We must assemble ourselves and augment our self-defense.”
Concurrently, this notably diverges from the Trump administration’s posture toward Taiwan that many anticipated. During my visit to Taiwan last year, in close proximity to the US election, I observed officials and everyday citizens expressing reasonable optimism regarding the implications of a prospective second Trump administration for them. The rationale is not difficult to comprehend. Throughout his initial term, Trump defied protocol by engaging directly with Taiwan’s president. He dispatched two Cabinet members to visit the country — marking the most senior US official excursions to the nation since the 1970s. Furthermore, he escalated arms dispensations, encompassing particular systems that the Obama administration had previously withheld. Trump’s initial term secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, subsequently advocated in 2022 for the US to formally acknowledge Taiwan’s sovereignty.
In contrast, during this term, as Trump has been in pursuit of a US-China trade accord, he has opted against approving $400 million in arms allocations to Taiwan, and he instructed Taiwan’s president, William Lai, to eschew a layover in New York during July.
Nevertheless, the Pentagon remains engaged in the China rivalry entirely. Likewise, in advance of Thursday’s Trump-Xi assembly, CBS documented that the US military’s Indo-Pacific Command had decreed a “demonstration of strength” maneuver to dissuade Chinese hostility in the South China Sea — though uncertainty surrounds the actual execution of the US operation. Trump additionally proclaimed on Thursday that the US would permit South Korea to access the technology requisite for constructing a nuclear submarine, an additional action apt to be perceived by China as provocative.
Are We Unwittingly Marching Towards War?
Regardless, the administration has, by and large, intimated that preparations for military clashes with China do not constitute a significant priority. The squadron of autonomous drones the Pentagon had been assembling to monitor China trails considerably behind its intended schedule. The Pentagon’s forthcoming national security doctrine anticipates downgrading Chinese rivalry, positioning it beneath border safeguarding and Western Hemisphere concerns.
“I think the Biden administration was strategic, but not ambiguous,” Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the conservative American Enterprise Institute who studies US-China competition, told Vox. “The Trump administration is ambiguous, but maybe not very strategic.”
Given our understanding of Trump’s sentiment regarding the employment of military force — he favors swift, conclusive strikes against less formidable targets, such as Iran, the Houthis, or purported drug vessels in the Caribbean, lacking the capacity for retaliation or drawing the US into a drawn-out conflict — envisioning his entanglement in a conflict with China proves challenging. Even considering the most upbeat scenarios (excluding nuclear escalation), such a war would entail casualties of a magnitude unseen by the US since World War II.
“In a Taiwan scenario, if you bomb China, they’re going to bomb you back,” said Jennifer Kavanagh, senior fellow at Defense Priorities.
Kavanagh, a proponent of diminishing the US defense establishment in Asia, asserted that as Taiwan oversees its own relations with Beijing and gears up for potential military strife, “I think it’s really important to assume that the US won’t come.”
Conversely, Trump is, if nothing else, unpredictable, as evidenced by the nuclear testing declaration on the precipice of his summit. The forthcoming years of Asian history may hinge upon the extent to which Xi is prepared to assess that unpredictability.
Source: vox.com
