Should the current truce in Gaza persist, it will represent the desperately needed end to an inexcusably brutal conflict. However, the broader view, including whether yet another calamitous flare-up can be averted, is a different concern. One element — while not the only one, a significant one nonetheless — hinges on whether the Israelis can be convinced to give peace talks a genuine opportunity.
Ilan Goldenberg has contemplated how to accomplish that for a considerable duration.
During his time as a senior Biden administration representative on the Israel-Palestine matter, Goldenberg unsuccessfully urged the White House to exert increased pressure on the Israelis to achieve a cessation of hostilities. Now, with the Trump administration having taken such action and secured an agreement for their endeavors, he observes opportunities for alterations in Israel’s fundamental stance on the conflict — either for the positive or the adverse.
The favorable scenario bears resemblance to the repercussions of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, during which Israel resisted a surprise invasion by Egyptian and Syrian armed forces. The initial triumph of the Arab offensive jolted an Israeli populace that had become excessively confident in their own capabilities, thus setting the stage for Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s choice to ratify a peace accord with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1978.
The unfavorable scenario is reminiscent of the aftermath of the Second Intifada in the 2000s, which was the most violent period of Israeli-Palestinian warfare preceding the present conflict. That clash, in which substantial numbers of Israeli civilians perished due to terrorist actions within its territories, prompted numerous Israelis to surmise that a negotiated settlement was unattainable — leading to a political movement toward the right that has resulted in an ever-intensifying occupation of the West Bank and Israel’s shockingly savage conduct during the Gaza war.
Therefore, which is more probable: an Israeli acknowledgment of the imperative for peace, or an escalation of the rationale of unending war? Goldenberg remains uncertain. However, he is convinced that a battle is presently unfolding that could sway the result in either direction.
“The most crucial element will be the upcoming elections in Israel next year,” he conveyed to me. “That’s the pivotal point of all of this.”
No peace with Netanyahu
The Trump ceasefire arrangement, in part, amounts to an agreement to defer any definitive decision.
While it purports to be a thoroughgoing agreement, the parties solely reached complete consensus on its near-term stipulations — such as the recent weekend’s hostage-prisoner exchange, coupled with an Israeli departure from a large segment of Gaza. There exist no mutually accepted concrete measures for executing its more enduring stipulations, such as Hamas’s disarmament or the deployment of an international peacekeeping presence in Gaza.
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Converting such notions from aspiration into reality will necessitate challenging compromises, and there exist valid grounds for skepticism concerning all parties implicated. President Donald Trump’s approach to foreign policy isn’t precisely distinguished for its follow-through or meticulousness. Concurrently, Hamas’s spree of killings following the ceasefire, during which the group publicly executed some of its Palestinian rivals within Gaza, implies that it harbors no desire to relinquish either weaponry or authority.
And concerning the Israeli side, the paramount challenge can be encapsulated in four words: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Having held power for 15 of the past 16 years, “Bibi” has exhibited an increasingly overt aversion to the very notion of genuine peace parleys. His political prospects hinge on a coalition with far-right factions who consider Israel’s principal error in Gaza to be a lack of sufficient force.
For as long as Netanyahu remains at the helm, he will almost certainly strive to undermine any endeavor to implement the agreement’s 19th and most ambitious provision: its aspiration to ultimately establish “a credible route to Palestinian self-governance and sovereignty, which we acknowledge as the ambition of the Palestinian populace.” Should Netanyahu’s prior actions serve as any indication, he will labor persistently to thwart this facet of the arrangement while endeavoring to attribute blame to Hamas for his own obstructionism.
“He’s an individual who, for two decades, has declined to assume any risk and guide the populace toward a more favorable situation,” Goldenberg asserts. “Instead, he has consistently catered to their most base instincts and anxieties.”
In practical terms, this closely resembles Israel’s Tuesday verdict, which has since been reversed, to diminish the quantity of aid entering Gaza to half of the stipulated levels.
The stated justification for the suspension was that Hamas had not adhered to its commitment to relinquish the remains of deceased Israeli captives. Irrespective of the veracity of this claim — it’s conceivable, as Hamas asserts, that they’re encountering difficulties in locating the remains — there existed no rationale for Israel to retaliate in such an extreme manner.
The most logical elucidation for its determination is that Netanyahu and his associates desire the agreement’s failure but wish to evade culpability for withdrawing from it without justification. Therefore, they are prepared to undertake drastic measures to destabilize it. And at a specific juncture, such endeavors are likely to succeed.
This is not to imply that they aspire to resume hostilities immediately. Resuming the conflict would constitute a flagrant offense to Trump, who is increasingly staking his standing on brokering “peace” in the Middle East. There exists a strong possibility that, as Goldenberg articulates it, “the major conflict is concluded,” irrespective of circumstances.
Nonetheless, the question transcends whether bombardments will commence in the near future. It concerns whether measures are being enacted to forestall another conflagration several years hence. This necessitates addressing the foundational condition of strife between the two entities: the absence of a thoroughly negotiated resolution that acknowledges the legitimate apprehensions and ambitions of both peoples. Absent such a resolution, another phase of savage combat is unavoidable.
Israel’s “most consequential” election
Assuming this rationale prevails, Netanyahu must relinquish office for this ceasefire to ultimately pave the way for a genuine peace. Consequently, Israel’s impending elections — currently slated for October 2026, although they could be convened sooner — are poised to be remarkably consequential. Michael Koplow, an authority at the Israel Policy Forum think tank, has penned that “the forthcoming elections will rank as the most critical in Israel’s chronicle.”
The encouraging aspect, at least for those who advocate for a sustained peace, is that Netanyahu is likely to be defeated.
“Scarcely anything in the past year and a half has significantly altered Netanyahu’s electoral potency.”
Initial polls taken since the ceasefire indicate that Netanyahu and his extremist right-wing coalition partners are projected to secure 48 seats out of a total of 120 in the Knesset (Israel’s legislative body). This actually signifies a slight enhancement relative to their previous figures, yet it remains significantly short of the 61 seats requisite to establish a ruling coalition — a deficit that has exhibited remarkable consistency over time.
“Scarcely anything in the past year and a half has significantly altered Netanyahu’s electoral potency,” notes Dahlia Scheindlin, a leading Israeli pollster.
Of course, Scheindlin advises caution, as those figures are subject to change. It is a recurrent theme in Middle Eastern journalism to characterize Netanyahu as a consummate political survivor, but it is a recurrent theme for a legitimate reason: He has managed to retain power far beyond the point at which numerous observers had written him off as doomed.
It remains to be seen whether the widespread jubilation within Israel concerning the return of the captives will effect change; robust polling data has yet to emerge since their liberation. However, the protracted consistency evident in the figures is so remarkable as to suggest that more profound, more intractable challenges may confront the prime minister.
Netanyahu’s sustained refusal to assume any accountability for the October 7 assault — or even convene a formal commission to probe culpability — has incensed Israelis who persist in enduring the trauma inflicted by the events of that day. Furthermore, the preponderance of Israelis believe Netanyahu has been protracting the war for strategic motives, which would imply that the ceasefire was not an accomplishment but rather something imposed upon him. It is also pertinent to recall that Netanyahu is an indicted criminal who initiated an offensive against the autonomy of Israel’s judiciary prior to the war, an action that instigated the most extensive protest movement in the nation’s narrative.
In spite of Netanyahu’s celebrated survival aptitudes, the odds this time around are decidedly stacked against him.
However, Netanyahu’s ouster does not guarantee Israel’s embarkation on a trajectory toward peace. It is a requisite condition — in that a durable peace is improbable while he remains in office — but it does not constitute a sufficient one. To resolve the Israeli component of the peace equation, it is necessary to confront the populace’s post-October 7 disenchantment regarding the prospects for any semblance of a genuine agreement. And this necessitates leadership prepared to champion such a cause to them.
“During periods of intense escalation, I have seldom witnessed the Israeli citizenry outpacing its leaders in embracing moderation,” Scheindlin observes. The 1978 Camp David accord, she notes, was initially met with reservations from the Israeli public. However, once “a legitimately elected leader articulated the rationale…then individuals altered their perspectives, and within a matter of months, they endorsed the agreement with commanding majorities.”
Whether such leadership exists presently remains unknown.
The opposition to Netanyahu is comprised of an assemblage of parties that encompass the ideological spectrum. Their leaders include far-right settlers such as Naftali Bennett, center-right hawks such as Benny Gantz, Zionist liberals such as Yair Golan, and even Arab Islamists such as Mansour Abbas.
These parties possess scant shared ground beyond a profound antipathy toward Netanyahu, which renders any coalition they may form susceptible to dissolution. Such a broad-based opposition assumed power in 2021, with Bennett serving as its inaugural prime minister, only to succumb to the burden of its own contradictions — thereby setting the stage for Netanyahu’s restoration to power.
At this juncture, we lack insight into which subgroupings of these parties will fare better and which will fare worse. A significant determinant will be not merely Netanyahu’s defeat, but also which of the various non-incumbent parties perform more favorably and what configuration of governing coalition the election engenders. A government headed by Bennett, for example, is less inclined to engage in earnest negotiations than one guided by the centrist Yair Lapid.
In summation, it is entirely plausible that this tenuous ceasefire could ultimately collapse, even in the event of Netanyahu’s electoral downfall. Conversely, should he remain in power, such prospects approach certitude. Should Trump, or any other individual, desire this arrangement to genuinely establish the groundwork for peace, they must commence by eliminating Netanyahu from the equation.
“There are numerous crucial junctures,” Goldenberg observes. “However, the initial one must involve his removal.”
Source: vox.com
