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With less than a year elapsed in President Donald Trump’s second term, we now have concrete proof that the alliance that propelled him to victory one year ago today is fracturing. The series of Republican defeats — and the scale of Democratic triumphs in New Jersey and Virginia, specifically — imply not only that the Democratic opposition to Trump has at last surfaced, but that a crucial component of Trump’s majority — Latino constituents — may not be reliably Republican voters after all.
Nowhere was this more apparent last night than in New Jersey, where exit surveys indicate that Democratic Gov.-elect Mikie Sherrill garnered nearly 70 percent of Latino voters, contrasted with the 31 percent who favored Republican Jack Ciattarelli. This signifies a major shift: Trump came within 6 points of securing the state in 2024, largely thanks to Black and Latino constituents who rallied for him statewide. Currently, in the districts, towns, and counties featuring sizable Latino communities that gravitated toward Trump last year, notably in North Jersey, Latino voters appeared to have participated at unexpectedly high rates, largely reverting to the Democratic camp.
However, numerous inquiries still remain: Are these disenchanted Trump supporters returning to the Democrats? Or will they simply abstain from future elections? To gain a clearer understanding of what we can — and cannot — infer from Tuesday’s outcomes, I consulted Carlos Odio, a prominent pollster and expert in US Latino politics, and the co-founder of the Democratic-leaning research firm Equis, for his insights. This discussion has undergone editing for conciseness and clarity.
Related
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- Reasons for the Democratic victories in the 2025 elections
Leading up to the election, what was your primary concern regarding Latino voters?
My initial question was whether this contest would resemble 2021, the most recent governor’s race, [with modest but consistent Latino backing for Democrats] or 2024, when Trump achieved substantial gains. Ultimately, it appears to mirror 2021. And I believe this suggests that, as we approach 2026, Latino support for Democrats is more likely to parallel the levels seen in 2021 rather than those of 2024.
Could you elaborate on that for me? What is the underlying importance of Latino voting patterns resembling 2021 more closely than 2024?
So if [Tuesday’s results] were more akin to 2024, then one might argue, these Trump gains were not an isolated incident. There exists a lasting shift that Republicans are maintaining and could potentially expand upon. Had this occurred, it would have indicated that Latinos would not participate in any “blue wave,” should such a phenomenon even materialize.
If the outcomes more closely resembled 2021, however, the conclusion would have been more along the lines of, we’ve returned to a more typical off-year election, something akin to that intermediate [degree of Latino support for Democrats] that we observed following 2020.
Thus, from our perspective today, it’s almost as if we’re reverting to the Latino vote’s state before the Biden presidency.
Which, it’s worth mentioning, most Democrats would still deem unsatisfactory. Not devastating, as in 2024, but still subpar.
That’s precisely correct. We remain in the Trump era.
I recall working in Florida during the 2018 cycle when Florida Hispanics notably abstained from the national “blue wave.” I observed that Latinos in Florida behaved uniquely, so to speak. The resistance was mobilizing individuals, but Latino constituents did not feel integrated into that wave or moment.
Therefore, a question for me entering this election was: How many Latinos would essentially think, I don’t feel motivated against Donald Trump. I am so dissatisfied with both parties that I will either sit this out or vote based on other factors; however, I am not catching the anti-Trump enthusiasm.
To what extent can we justifiably extrapolate from this election and apply it to our forecasts for the midterm elections or even the subsequent presidential election?
Can one derive conclusions from last night in New Jersey to predict what will transpire in Texas? I don’t believe that’s entirely accurate, yet these outcomes undeniably constitute a more robust data point than anything we’ve encountered thus far this year. Examining the trends dating back to 2016, off-year and presidential years indeed present different narratives, implying that the events of 2025 may not necessarily reveal much about the prospects for 2028. However, I consider it a relatively reliable indicator of expectations for 2026, or at least it establishes a superior benchmark than 2024 for forecasting 2026.
To what degree were the results a consequence of persuasion — Latinos who voted for Trump in 2024 casting ballots for Democrats in 2025 — versus pro-Trump Latinos simply not participating in this off-year election?
We must dismantle the implicit barrier in your inquiry that separates these voter categories. The reality is that support and turnout tend to correlate. When individuals have someone to champion, they are more inclined to vote. Conversely, when they dislike their options, they are less likely to vote. And so, our polling indicates that 11 percent of Latino Trump voters express a willingness to vote for a Democrat in 2026.
That actually proves to be significant. That represents a notable segment. Simultaneously, one can observe Trump’s strengths lying within the more irregular-voting Latino demographic — those who abstained from voting in 2022, who did not turn out — and who might also abstain in 2026. Nonetheless, I would also argue that even among these voters, the situation is not straightforward. I believe another aspect exists: low-propensity voters are the most volatile, the most susceptible to the prevailing atmosphere. And currently, we are observing that the Latinos who vote sporadically are the most disillusioned with Trump.
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Source: vox.com
