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Bring your small child along on your daily journey through Penn Station, and it won’t be long before you’re explaining things. As we moved through the Long Island Railroad terminal, my boy was puzzled by the three adjacent chicken eateries—Chick-fil-A, Raising Cane’s, and Pollo Campero—and by the circumstance that a store called Gotham News seemed mostly focused on selling sweets and bottled water. He also wondered about the individuals he saw, as they walked or stood, sipping from containers concealed in brown paper bags. “What’s with the bags?” was his query.
Where does one begin? Concealing drinks this way is one of those societal customs that remains somewhat illogical even after clarification. As everyone understands, the intention is for the bags to conceal the drink inside, enabling both the drinker and the law enforcement to overlook regulations that prohibit alcohol consumption in public areas. It’s obvious, though, that the bags fail to genuinely obscure anything; rather, they are exclusively used for, and clearly indicate, the act of drinking. (One would never consider consuming a Fiji water bottle contained within a paper bag.) Elaborating on the rationale exposes its strangeness. The drinkers are aware that the officers are aware of their drinking, and the officers are aware that the drinkers are aware of their awareness. However, the officers feign ignorance, while keeping the discretion to suddenly “notice” the transgression if the drinker acts disruptively. Meanwhile, non-drinkers benefit from a train station that gives off a more refined appearance than reality dictates.
Surely, these peculiar swirls of convoluted reasoning are not indicative of our typical thought patterns; human affairs are usually more transparent. Yet, this is precisely the premise that Steven Pinker explores in his latest book, “When Everyone Knows That Everyone Knows . . . : Common Knowledge and the Mysteries of Money, Power, and Everyday Life.” The conundrum of who-knows-who-knows-what, ever-captivating for those who enjoy mystery novels and espionage stories, has long occupied the minds of psychologists and game theoreticians. “As a mind scientist, I’ve devoted my life to understanding the ways people think,” Pinker pens. “Therefore, what would fascinate me most is how people ponder what other people ponder, and their contemplations on what other people surmise they ponder, and then how they muse about what others assume they muse.” Pinker contends that these cyclical patterns of thought are not merely intellectual games for academics; they constitute a fundamental aspect of our lives.
Generally, “common knowledge” describes those concepts or facts that we all are familiar with: for instance, the Pledge of Allegiance or the definition of LOL. However, Pinker holds a more precise definition in his thoughts. Common knowledge, he elucidates, goes beyond mere awareness; it encompasses the understanding that we share this awareness. This differs from “mutual knowledge,” which is knowledge held by a collective but not openly acknowledged. Suppose you realize the sovereign is unclothed, and I also realize this, that constitutes mutual knowledge: neither party can confirm that the other is aware. Conversely, if I possess confidence that you possess awareness, and you possess confidence that I possess awareness, then that awareness is shared. “When the young boy declared the sovereign’s nakedness, he didn’t introduce anything new to those present,” Pinker records. Still, “by exclaiming what everyone within sight could observe”—Pinker references idioms like “spilling the beans,” or “making it public”—he transformed the sovereign’s nudity into universal awareness, sufficiently enough to redirect everyone’s attitude of the sovereign “from dutiful respect to mockery and scorn.”
The tale of the sovereign’s lacking apparel shows how common awareness drives collaborative endeavors. Every individual within the kingdom is privy to the monarch’s inanity—nevertheless, none dare to independently voice critique. Each prioritizes self-preservation. Game theoreticians describe this as a coördination problem. Group action would facilitate revolution; however, individual initiative incurs retribution. Even worse, individuals are motivated to subvert the common interest, by, for example, betraying others or rejecting reality. However, after the sovereign’s nudity transitions into shared awareness, the coördination problem becomes solvable.
Life involves numerous coördination obstacles remedied through shared awareness, Pinker documents. In a straightforward scenario, two individuals aiming to simultaneously pass through a tight doorway may effectively coördinate if they consciously adhere to similar norms regarding preferential treatment. (They might both be cognizant of the custom that priority is given to the first arrival, or to the superior, or according to “ladies first.”) In America, the common awareness is to operate vehicles on the right-hand side, not the left. As I read Pinker, I was reminded of the New York custom where pedestrians typically await their crossing in the street rather than at the curb. Drivers in the city accommodate this, and pedestrians are aware of this, and vice versa. Replicate this in unfamiliar settings and you jeopardize your safety.
According to Pinker, sizeable groups often resolve the coördination task of unification by cultivating beliefs that are “widely acknowledged but difficult to substantiate.” Pinker references a conviction on the American right “that the 2020 presidential election was manipulated,” and the view “within the educated left” that “one’s identity as a male or female is unrelated to biology.” Due to their controversial and non-evident nature—diverging greatly from stating “that the sun arises in the east,” Pinker writes—these ideas serve as concrete indicators of group affiliation. Upon hearing an individual voice their belief in Pizzagate, one may confidently infer their adherence to numerous related notions, thereby initiating coördination.
Concepts similar to these enable vastly different people to find commonality. Shared awareness is esteemed highly; it morphs into a criteria of belonging and a catalyst for discord. It sculpts society’s direction and affects us as individuals. Nevertheless, Pinker’s analysis reveals it is related to more harmless beliefs and conventions, such as the traffic regulations. For devotees of “KPop Demon Hunters,” the conviction that the vocalist EJAE displays unique generational abilities because of her exceptional vocal scope, extending across two and a half octaves, stands firm; inside MAGA circles, the common awareness stipulates the radical left’s initiative to instill gender ideology into children; within various artificial intelligence factions, widespread acknowledgement acknowledges the possibility of superintelligence ascending in global dominance imminently. How may our existence transform if these convictions were perceived not as intrinsically appealing ideas but as uniquely effective resolutions to coördination complications?
As those aspiring to concerted effort nurture shared awareness, they also regulate, suppress, and dismiss it, both to sustain group coherence and to dissociate from undesired communities. Religious congregations might punish dissenters challenging accepted awareness; this occasionally provides avenues for individuals to demonstrate their affiliation by aiding in punitive actions. The growing crowd amplifies everyone’s conviction in the dogma. (Pinker suggests this phenomenon underlies cancel culture.) “The inner circle surrounding a declining leader may portray an illusion of normalcy”; those insiders might be endeavoring to forestall the transformation of mutual awareness of his weakening (commonly acknowledged) into shared awareness (everyone acknowledges that everyone acknowledges it). Parallelly, when an erratic leader delivers autocratic pronouncements, his followers may insist his statements are “mere jest.” Their actions resemble placing a brown paper bag around the alcoholic beverage.
Yet, evading shared awareness may, in other circumstances, be subtle and even pleasing. Picture two mutually interested parties arranging a rendezvous, yet executing the plan in a manner that obstructs their mutual fascination from evolving into acknowledged awareness. (Two friends can relish a hike, can they not?) The elements hidden by the duo could elevate the attraction—or provide a fallback if the charge dissolves. Pinker references an episode of “Seinfeld” wherein George relays specifics of a recent rendezvous to Jerry and Elaine. “At midnight, she beckons me to visit for ‘coffee,’ ” George recalls. “I decline the offer. ‘No thank you. I’m not interested in coffee. It will disrupt my sleep. It’s too late for caffeine.’ Those were my words. Individuals displaying that amount of dullness shouldn’t live!” What hindered his date from exhibiting greater directness in her invitation? Pinker concludes that such avoidance offers “defensible ambiguity regarding awareness.” George comprehends the trajectory he anticipates for the evening, and one might presume she does too, but her displayed unawareness affords each a chance to retreat. It may prove advantageous to feign mere friendship.
In varied situations, insufficient awareness may cripple individuals with essential collaboration requirements. In the series “Couples Therapy,” psychoanalyst Orna Guralnik guides couples in replacing their unique perspectives on their disagreements with a consensus comprehension of the issues. She aids in developing this comprehension, routinely tasking them to articulate it for each other, eliminating doubts that both parties comprehend the situation. “This gives you a very evident understanding of required actions,” she imparts to a representative couple, after encapsulating their issues. Now, only one inquiry lingers: will the couple act according to their acknowledged knowledge?
Contemplating the country’s condition, one could consider if its shared awareness has devolved. Pinker describes how social media has remolded the mechanics of our shared awareness. He writes that on digital platforms, “the missives evoke shared awareness, at least within relevant circles,” and users are urged to support constructing that awareness by favoring, reposting, or showing their personal acknowledgment of what’s known. New opportunities for shaping shared awareness surface continually on feeds, and thus, Pinker suggests, we commit excessive time and vigor to validating and rejecting practices encompassed in this manufacturing. How can deceleration be achieved? One approach involves generally withdrawing from social settings that are overly invested in dictating appropriate thoughts for our demographic. Similarly, it’s crucial to exercise greater caution when welcoming convictions that prioritize segregation over enlightenment.
Many technologies are underpinned by the reasonable presumption that transparency fosters progress, and elevated awareness generates advancement. Pinker remarks that “massive interconnectedness signifies Homo sapiens’ evolutionary niche.” Our advancement as a species derives from collective activity in increasingly large collectives. “If shared awareness underpins collaboration,” he proceeds, “why refrain from frankness?” Why not advocate for “absolute sincerity” and all-encompassing transparency? The “argument against pursuing this strategy,” as Pinker sees it, lies in the idea that shared awareness isn’t inherently valuable; it serves a function. Its function involves nurturing unity, whereas certain unveiled truths fragment us.
The internet, once glorified as a collaborative apparatus, supposedly empowered cooperation and coördination at groundbreaking dimensions. Experts theorized about “smart mobs” and the collective intelligence of gatherings. Since that era, we have recognized challenges from deceit, filter bubbles, and popularity. Pinker’s book, however, reframes those apprehensions. It demonstrates that establishing, broadcasting, avowing, and repudiating shared awareness is immensely more intricate than believed. Our objective extends beyond solely amassing greater awareness. Instead, customary social interactions demand deliberate measures: unveiling select details and obscuring others to meticulously modulate affiliations. We may lead double lives, knowing yet acting unaware, or acknowledging others’ knowledge of our awareness, while denying our cognizance of their knowledge. Partial cognizance might feel peculiar, but we operate accordingly because of the world’s complexities, necessitating flexibility.
In reality, one might characterize the internet less as a collaborative utility and more as a channel for voicing opinions. Though expedited articulation can boost coördination, it can also undermine it. Online, we swiftly ascertain perceptions and then promptly validate or refute, circumventing the complexities intrinsic to awareness. Simplifying, it resembles the Tinder-fication of society, with the complex social courtship displaced by the straightforward ease of selecting yes or no. Reinstating a nuanced strategy for shared awareness may prove difficult in a world depleted of nuance. ♦
Sourse: newyorker.com
