Last month, the special inspector General for Afghanistan reconstruction (sigar), has released a new inspection report that found, after four years and $60 million project called northeast energy systems designed to provide economical and reliable power supply to serve the population in Afghanistan is not yet operational. According to the report, the project was not due to problems of land acquisition and because “no provision of the agreement, to permanently connect the system to the power supply”.
Vague reports about a failed project power may not seem like a big deal on its face. But in August last year, President Donald trump has violated his campaign promise and committed to a specific strategy in the war in Afghanistan. The American military will be in this war-torn country indefinitely to create Afghan security forces and to support their economic development. Trump’s decision was met favorably the creation of foreign policy, despite the lack of clear details in his statement. One commentator called it one of his “best moments as President”.
Reports and audits from cigars to tell a similar story. USA is achieving very little in the way of sustainable development in Afghanistan, even if there is a huge amount of time and resources that were invested. Continue thus, after almost two decades to show that we have learned nothing, despite years of evidence of little progress. The fatal conceit of nation-building still dominates our foreign policy thinking. It’s not “perfect” moment. It’s a shame and delirium.
Problems that interfere with northeastern energy systems indicate broader failures of our attempts to export economic development. The contract written by the engineering corps of the US army and was awarded the Afghan construction company, says that the Afghan government needs to acquire land for the construction of the system. The government is not able to do it, with the result that the residents “still live in houses on this earth and, in some cases living and the cultivation of the land directly under the transmission towers and power lines”. Farmers also refused to clear the track of lines of trees, brush, and other vegetation, because the government compensates them.
On top of land issues, the Treaty does not contain any requirements for system connection to the national grid, despite its nearly 200 towers and the necessary transmission lines. Officials from the army corps of engineers told the cigars they didn’t write the “contract of the subscription right or as clearly as they should, and that the contract only says that the Contractor must achieve power without determining how the connection will be made.”
Viewed in isolation, this may seem a small subject of confusion and misunderstanding, which can easily be eliminated. But looking at other reports of the cigar reveals the same problem. Audit of the operational group of the Ministry of defense for business and stability operations issued in January 2018 was called “675 million dollars in costs led to mixed results, waste and short-lived projects.” The task force was formed in 2011 to “reduce violence, enhance stability, and support economic normalcy in Afghanistan through strategic business and economic activities”—in other words, to build the nation. Despite the bad accounting on the part of the target group, cigar came to the conclusion that “obviously [they] were not able to achieve its goals” due to the lack of “a clear mission and strategy, combined with bad coordination, planning, Contracting, and control.” Of 675 million dollars in the target group commitments, there were only 316 million dollars to support projects in Afghanistan. Under these contracts under the project, 78 per cent either only partially or not fully meet their results.
Another test in the period from October 2017 the considered projects from the infrastructure development Fund in Afghanistan, mutual defence and the Department of State enterprises to run large-scale infrastructure projects to support the strategy of counter-insurgency. Was launched in 2011, six different projects. Four of them were more than a year behind schedule, are considered to be possibly counterproductive for punitive purposes, and not enough “adequate assurance plans”. Together they were worth $ 400 million.
Analysis of all cigars, issued inspection reports associated with the Department of state and USAID reconstruction projects in Afghanistan from August 2009 to March 2017 showed that the construction of such facilities as schools and hospitals “were not always completed in accordance with contract requirements and specifications, resulting in substandard services.” Projects with deficiencies “is too often the norm, due to poorly trained or unqualified contractor personnel, inferior materials, poor workmanship, lack of government oversight and potential fraud.” More than half of the projects reviewed did not comply with the contract requirements, and several structural problems that threatened the safety of their passengers.
As you probably can tell, the most recent failure of reconstruction not an isolated case. Across the Board, recovery efforts are either not able to achieve their goals, or perform lukewarmly at best. In addition, the U.S. is losing the military battle. In his quarterly report to Congress since January, the inspector General, John F. Sopko, writes that “[h]istorically, the number of areas under the control or influence of the government is reduced with cigars began reporting on it, while the number under the control or influence of the militants is growing.” The government of Afghanistan controls only 56 percent of the territory, with 30 percent being challenged by fighters. In 2015, the militants under the influence of only 7 percent of the population.
The troubles of reconstruction the US stem from the fundamental problem of collective action. “Reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and other countries suffers from two major problems. The first is the problem of knowledge, by prying the lack of context-specific knowledge required for successful completion of projects the criteria for sustainable development,” says Christopher Coyne, Professor, George Mason University, specialist on the political economy of foreign intervention and reconstruction. “The second is the problem of motivation. Those carrying out activities on reconstruction to use other people’s resources and face weak liability and punishment, when projects are unable to achieve their goals. The combination of these two problems is a recipe for waste, fraud, and abuse”.
Despite the bad reports, and after more than 6000 days already there, the United States remains committed to an indefinite military and reconstruction presence in Afghanistan. President trump last summer talked about solving the problems of Afghanistan through economic development, but this will not work in place without a sustainable infrastructure, and institutions.
We are unable to do that. So at what point do we say enough? How many more reports detailing the failure we read?
Jerrod A. Laber is a writer and journalist living in Northern Virginia. It was written by an employee with the Foundation of the future of America and the free brother of the Society with young voices. His work has appeared in real defensein the Washington examiner, the Columbus dispatch, among others. Follow him on Twitter @JerrodALaber.
Sourse: theamericanconservative.com
